M Falah Aufa A
Yogyakarta, Indonesia
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Wazuh SIEM: Log Analysis & Detection Engineering

Blue Team / SOC / Detection Engineering2026
Wazuh SIEM: Log Analysis & Detection Engineering

An enterprise-grade detection home lab modeling end-to-end SOC Analyst and Detection Engineering operations. Built an isolated VirtualBox environment featuring Wazuh 4.14.6 (all-in-one Manager, Indexer, and Dashboard), an instrumented Ubuntu Server 24.04 endpoint, and a dedicated Kali Linux attacking node. Generated adversarial SSH brute-force traffic using parallel Hydra attacks and custom sequential automation scripts. Authored and tuned custom correlation rule 100002 to suppress default noise and accelerate detection speed by 37.5%, followed by automated host containment through Wazuh Active Response via iptables with automated 600-second timeout recovery.

Key Impact & Outcome

Achieved 37.5% faster brute-force detection over Wazuh defaults (5 vs 8 failed attempts), 100% alert verification accuracy across 50 attack runs, and sub-second automated host isolation via iptables Active Response.

Stack & Tools
Wazuh 4.14.6SIEMDetection EngineeringActive ResponseHydrasshpassiptablesUbuntu ServerKali LinuxVirtualBoxMITRE ATT&CK
Proof of Work

Key Metrics & Measurable Impact

Empirical telemetry collected across attack simulations, custom correlation rule tuning, and automated containment runs.

Faster Detection
37.5%

5 attempts (custom rule 100002) vs 8 attempts (default Wazuh 5712)

Rule Trigger Accuracy
100%

6 alerts verified consistently across 30 attempts (30 / 5 = 6)

Core Phases Complete
5 / 5

Infrastructure, agent ingestion, attack simulation, rule tuning, and active response

Telemetry Analyzed
~1,984

Authentication-failure events evaluated during noise rule suppression

Attack Runs Tested
50 Runs

Parallel Hydra simulations (-t 16) and sequential sshpass scripts

Documented Evidence
97 Files

Technical screenshots across 6 evidence folders and 9 markdown reports

Artifacts & Visual Evidence

Work Artifacts & Key Evidence

Selected technical screenshots and logs. Use the side arrows to scroll or click any card to inspect.

Full Detection Chain in Dashboard
EVIDENCE #01↗
assets/active-response/04-dashboard-active-response-berhasil.png

Full Detection Chain in Dashboard

End-to-end detection timeline in Wazuh Dashboard: initial noisy rule triggers, custom correlation rule suppression, and automated Active Response host containment in a unified workflow.

Inspect Evidence ↗Click to zoom
Custom Detection Rule Trigger
EVIDENCE #02↗
assets/alerts/14-custom-rule-berhasil-trigger.png

Custom Detection Rule Trigger

Custom correlation rule (ID 100002) successfully fired following threshold tuning (lowered from 8 to 5) and parent SID logic validation.

Inspect Evidence ↗Click to zoom
Active Response Containment (iptables)
EVIDENCE #03↗
assets/active-response/06-iptables-rule-block-verified.png

Active Response Containment (iptables)

Technical verification of automated host isolation: malicious attacker IP dropped directly via iptables firewall rule with automated 600s expiration.

Inspect Evidence ↗Click to zoom
Wazuh Dashboard Overview
EVIDENCE #04↗
assets/setup/16-wazuh-dashboard-overview.png

Wazuh Dashboard Overview

Initial landing view of Wazuh Dashboard confirming healthy single-node cluster status and operational services post-installation.

Inspect Evidence ↗Click to zoom
Endpoint Log Forwarding Active
EVIDENCE #05↗
assets/linux-agent/18-agent-terdaftar-di-dashboard.png

Endpoint Log Forwarding Active

Linux endpoint successfully enrolled and active, validating the end-to-end secure log ingestion and forwarding pipeline over TCP 1514.

Inspect Evidence ↗Click to zoom

Investigation Timeline

01

Infrastructure Deployment & Resource Tuning

Deployed Wazuh 4.14.6 Manager, Indexer, and Dashboard all-in-one on Ubuntu Server 24.04 LTS (192.168.56.104). Overcame indexer resource lockups by reallocating VM specs to 8 GB RAM and 4 vCPUs.

❯ systemctl status wazuh-manager wazuh-indexer wazuh-dashboard
02

Adversarial Simulation via Hydra & SSHPass

Generated structured attack traffic from Kali Linux (192.168.56.102) against target endpoint (192.168.56.106) using Hydra (-t 16, 40 attempts) and sequential sshpass scripts (10 attempts).

❯ hydra -l invalid_user -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt -t 16 ssh://192.168.56.106
03

Custom Correlation Rule & Threshold Optimization

Engineered custom rule 100002 matching non-existent user login failures (if_matched_sid: 5710) with frequency=5 in 120s. Resolved rule redundancy where default rule 5712 previously consumed the event window.

❯ <rule id="100002" level="10" frequency="5" timeframe="120"> <if_matched_sid>5710</if_matched_sid> <description>Custom: Rapid SSH brute force (non-existent users)</description> </rule>
04

Active Response Containment & Verification

Validated active response command firewall-drop triggering active iptables DROP rules against attacker IP with a 600-second auto-unblock timeout. Verified mathematically: 30 attempts / 5 threshold = exactly 6 fired alerts.

❯ iptables -L -n -v | grep 192.168.56.102 # DROP target active
Implementation Matrix

Implementation Phases & Checklist

26/29 Tasks (90%)
  • ✓
    Provision 3 VirtualBox VMs (Manager, Linux endpoint, Kali Linux)

    ↳ Dual-adapter NAT + Host-only 192.168.56.0/24

  • ✓
    Install Ubuntu Server 24.04 LTS (unattended installation)
  • ✓
    Troubleshoot VirtualBox PXE boot loop order issue
  • ✓
    Configure SSH remote administration from Windows Terminal
  • ✓
    Install Wazuh all-in-one stack (Manager, Indexer, Dashboard 4.14.6)
  • ✓
    Resolve indexer resource lockup by upgrading VM to 8 GB RAM and 4 vCPUs
  • ✓
    Deploy Linux endpoint VM and install Wazuh Agent
  • ✓
    Resolve WAZUH_MANAGER environment variable reset under sudo
  • ✓
    Verify agent active status and live auth.log telemetry pipeline
  • ✓
    Validate Threat Hunting dashboards, SCA, Vulnerability Detection, and MITRE mapping
  • ✓
    Execute parallel SSH brute-force attack via Hydra (-t 16, 40 attempts)
  • ✓
    Execute sequential SSH brute-force simulation via sshpass script (10 attempts)
  • ✓
    Compare attack telemetry signatures and fired rules across both methods
  • ✓
    Analyze ~1,984 authentication-failure telemetry events
  • ✓
    Assess alert fatigue on default rule 5710 (authentication failure)
  • ✓
    Author custom correlation rule 100002 in local_rules.xml
  • ✓
    Debug if_sid vs if_matched_sid logic for multi-attempt correlation
  • ✓
    Tune frequency threshold from 8 to 5 to outpace default rule 5712 (37.5% faster)
  • ✓
    Validate rule syntax and evaluation logic with wazuh-logtest
  • ✓
    Recover from Wazuh Manager database corruption (wazuh-db reset)
  • ✓
    Verify custom rule trigger in Dashboard against live attack traffic (6 alerts from 30 attempts)
  • ✓
    Configure Active Response firewall-drop tied to custom Rule 100002
  • ✓
    Validate automated host containment (iptables DROP target) against attacker IP
  • ✓
    Verify automated unblock recovery after 600s timeout and manual CLI release
  • ✓
    Produce blue-team Incident Report (IOC, Timeline, Root Cause, Remediation)
  • ✓
    Draft SOC Containment Playbook and Detection Rule specifications
  • ◐
    Organize repository structure and prepare local documentation assets

    ↳ Assets verified, repository restructuring in progress

  • ○
    Integrate Windows endpoint agent and simulate RDP brute-force vectors
  • ○
    Implement File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) and Linux SSH hardening
Artifacts & Research

Documentation & Technical Reports

Ethical Disclaimer

This project was developed strictly for cybersecurity research, defense engineering, and professional portfolio demonstration. All adversarial simulations were executed within an isolated, self-hosted virtual lab network (VirtualBox Host-only subnet) targeting owned assets exclusively, without interaction with any third-party infrastructure.

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Splunk Enterprise: SIEM Log Collection & Detection

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